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THE BREVIARY OF IESTHETIC’ 
I 
“WHAT IS ART?” 
reply to the question, “What  is art?”, it might be said IN jocosely (but this would not be a bad joke) that ar t  is 
what everybody knows it to be. And indeed, if it were not 
to some extent known what it is, it would be impossible even 
to ask that question, for  every question implies a certain 
knowledge of what is asked about, designated in the ques- 
tion and therefore known and qualified. A proof of this is 
to be found in the fact that we often hear expressed just and 
profound ideas in relation to art  by those who make no pro- 
fession of philosophy or  of theory, by laymen, by artists 
who do not like to reason, by the ingenuous, and even by the 
common people: these ideas are sometimes implicit in judg- 
ments concerning particular works of art, but a t  others as- 
sume altogether the form of aphorisms and of definitions. 
Thus it happens that there arises the belief in the possibility 
of making blush, at  will, any proud philosopher who should 
believe himself to have “discovered” the nature of art, by 
placing before his eyes or  making ring in his ears proposi- 
tions taken from the most superficial books o r  phrases of the 
most ordinary conversation, and shewing that they already 
most clearly contained his vaunted discovery. 
And in this case the philosopher would have good reason 
to blush-that is, had he ever nourished the illusion of intro- 
ducing into universal human consciousness, by means of his 
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doctrines, something altogether original, something extra- 
neous to  this consciousness, the revelation of an altogether 
new world. But he does not blush, and continues upon 
his way, for he is not ignorant that the question as to what 
is art  (as  indeed every philosophical question as to the nature 
of the real, o r  in general every question of knowledge), even 
if by its use of language it seem to assume the aspect of a 
general and total problem, which it is claimed to solve for 
the first and last time, has always, as a matter of fact, a cir- 
cumscribed meaning, referable to  the particular difficulties 
that assume vitality at a determined moment in the history 
of thought. Certainly, truth does walk the streets, like the 
esprit of the well-known French proverb, o r  like metaphor, 
“queen of tropes’’ according to  rhetoricians, which Mon- 
taigne discovered in the babil of his chambrikre. But the 
metaphor used by the maid is the solution of a problem of 
expression proper to  the feelings that affect the maid at  that 
moment; and the obvious affirmations that by accident o r  in- 
tent one hears every day as to the nature of art, are solu- 
tions of logical problems, as they present themselves to this 
or that individual, who is not a philosopher by profession, 
and yet as man is also to some extent a philosopher. And as 
the maid’s metaphor usually expresses but a small and vul- 
gar  world of feeling compared with that of the poet, so the 
obvious affirmation of one who is not a philosopher solves a 
problem small by comparison with that which occupies the 
philosopher. T h e  answer as to what is ar t  may appear 
similar in both cases, but is different in both cases owing 
to the different degree of richness of its intimate content; 
because the answer of the philosopher worthy of the name 
has neither more nor less than the task of solving in an 
adequate manner all the problems as to the nature of art  that 
have arisen down to that moment in the course of history; 
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whereas that of the layman, since it revolves in a far  nar- 
rower space, shews itself to be impotent outside those limits. 
Actual proof of this is also to be found in the force of the 
eternal Socratic method, in the facility with which the 
learned, by pressing home their questions, leave those with- 
out learning in open-mouthed confusion, though these had 
nevertheless begun by speaking well ; but now finding them- 
selves, in the course of the inquiry, in danger of losing what 
small knowledge they possessed, they have no resource but 
to retire into their shell, declaring that they do not like 
“subtleties.” 
T h e  philosopher’s pride is solely based therefore upon 
the greater intensity of his questions and answers; a pride 
not unaccompanied y i th  modesty- that is, with the con- 
sciousness that i f  his sphere be wider, or  the largest pos- 
sible, at  a determined moment, yet it is limited by the history 
of that moment, and cannot pretend to a value of totality, 
or  what is called a defiizite solution. T h e  ulterior life of the 
spirit, renewing and multiplying problems, does not so much 
falsify, as render inadequate preceding solutions, part of 
them falling among the number of those truths that are un- 
derstood, and part needing to be again taken up and inte- 
grated. A system is a house, which, as soon as it has been 
built and decorated, has need of continuous labour, more o r  
less energetic, in order to keep it in repair (subject as it is to 
the corrosive action of the elements) ; and at a certain mo- 
ment there is no longer any use in restoring and propping 
up the system, we must demolish and reconstruct it from top 
to bottom. But with this capital difference: that in the work 
of thought, the perpetually new house is perpetually main- 
tained by the old one, which persists in it, almost by an act 
of magic. As we know, those superficial or  ingenuous souls 
that are ignorant of this magic are terrified at  i t ;  so much so, 
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that one of their tiresome refrains against philosophy is that 
it continually undoes its work, and that one philosopher 
contradicts another: as though man did not always make 
and unmake his houses, and as though the architect that fol- 
lows did not always contradict the architect that precedes ; 
and as though it were possible to  draw the conclusion from 
this making and unmaking of houses and from this contra- 
diction among architects, that it is useless to  make houses ! 
T h e  answers of the philosopher, though they have the ad- 
vantage of greater intensity, also carry with them the dan- 
gers of greater error, and are often vitiated by a sort of lack 
of good sense, which has an aristocratic character, in so 
f a r  as it belongs to  a superior sphere of culture, and even 
when meriting reproof, is the object not only of disdain and 
derision, but also of secret envy and admiration. This is the 
foundation of the contrast, that many delight to  illustrate, 
between the mental equilibrium of ordinary people and the 
extravagances of philosophers; since, for example, it is clear 
that no man of good sense would have said that ar t  is a 
reflexion of the sexual instinct, o r  that it is something 
maleficent and deserves to  be banned from well-ordered re- 
publics. These absurdities have, however, been uttered 
by philosophers and even by great philosophers. But 
the innocence of the man of common sense is poverty, the 
innocence of the savage; and though there have often been 
sighs for  the life of the savage, and a remedy has been called 
for  to  rescue good sense from philosophies, it remains a 
fact that the spirit, in its development, courageously affronts 
the dangers of civilisation and the momentary loss of good 
sense. T h e  researches of the philosopher in relation to art  
must tread the paths of error in order to find the path of 
truth, which does not differ from, but is, those very paths of 
error which contain a clue to the labyrinth. 
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T h e  close connection of error and truth arises from the 
fact that  a complete and total error is inconceivable, and, 
since it is inconceivable, does not exist. E r ro r  speaks with 
two voices, one of which affirms the false, but the other 
denies i t ;  it is a colliding of yes and no, which is called con- 
tradiction. Therefore, when we descend from general con- 
siderations to the examination of a theory that has been 
condemned as erroneous in its definite particulars, we find 
the cure in the theory itself-that is, the true theory, which 
grows out of the soil of error. Thus it happens that those 
very people who claim to reduce art  to the sexual instinct, 
in order to demonstrate their thesis have recourse to argu- 
ments and meditations which, instead of uniting, separate 
ar t  from that instinct; o r  that he who would expel poetry 
from the well-constituted republic, shudders in so doing, and 
himself creates a new and sublime poetry. There have been 
historical periods in which the most crude and perverted 
doctrines of ar t  have dominated; yet this did not prevent 
the habitual and secure separation of the beautiful from the 
ugly at those periods, nor the very subtle discussion of the 
theme when the abstract theory was forgotten and particular 
cases were studied. E r ro r  is always condemned, not by the 
mouth of the judge, but ex ore suo. 
Owing to this close connection with error, the affirmation 
of the truth is always a process of strife, by means of which 
it keeps freeing itself in error  from error:  whence arises 
another pious but impossible desire, namely, that which de- 
mands that truth should be directly exposed, without discus- 
sion o r  polemic; that it should be permitted to proceed 
majestically alone upon its way: as if this stage parade were 
the symbol suited to truth, which is thought itself, and, as 
thought, ever active and in labour. Indeed, nobody succeeds 
in exposing a truth, save by criticising the different solutions 
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of the problem with which it is connected; and there is no 
philosophical treatise, however weak, no little scholastic 
manual o r  academic dissertation, which does not collect at 
its beginning or  contain in its body a review of opinions, his- 
torically given o r  ideally possible, which it wishes to oppose 
o r  to correct. This fact, though frequently realised in a 
capricious and disorderly manner, just expresses the legiti- 
mate desire to pass in review all the solutions that have been 
attempted in history or  are possible of achievement in idea 
(that is, at the present moment, though always in history), 
in such a way that the new solution shall include in itself all 
the preceding labour of the human spirit. 
But this demand is a Zogicd demand, and as such intrinsic 
to every true thought and inseparable from i t ;  and we must 
not confound it with a definite literary form of exposi- 
tion, in order that we may not fall into the pedantry for 
which the scholastics of the Middle Ages and the dialec- 
ticians of the school of Hegel in the nineteenth century be- 
came celebrated, which is very closely connected with 
the formalistic superstition, and represents a belief in the 
marvellous virtue of a certain sort of extrinsic and mechan- 
ical philosophical exposition. W e  must, in short, understand 
it in a substantial, not in an accidental sense, respecting the 
spirit, not the letter, and proceed with freedom in the ex- 
position of our own thought, according to time, place, and 
person. Thus, in these rapid lectures intended to provide as 
it were a guide to the right way of thinking out problems of 
art, I shall carefully refrain from narrating (as  I have done 
elsewhere) the whole process of liberation from erroneous 
conceptions of art, mounting upwards from the poorest to 
the richest; and I shall cast far  away, not from myself, but 
from my readers, a part  of the baggage with which they will 
charge themselves when, prompted thereto by the sight of 
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the country passed over in our bird’s flight, they shall set 
themselves to accomplish more particular voyages in this o r  
that part  of it, o r  to cross it again from end to end. 
However, connecting the question which has given occa- 
sion to this indispensable prologue (indispensable for  the 
purpose of removing from my discourse every appearance 
of pretentiousness, and also all blemish of inutility) ,-the 
question as to what is art,-I will say at once, in the simplest 
manner, that ar t  is vision or  intuition. T h e  artist produces 
an image o r  a phantasm; and he who enjoys ar t  turns his 
gaze upon the point to which the artist has pointed, looks 
through the chink which he has opened, and reproduces that 
image in himself. “Intuition,” “vision,” “contemplation,” 
“imagination,” “fancy,” “figurations,” “representations,” 
and so on, are words continually recurring, like synonyms, 
when discoursing upon art, and they all lead the mind to the 
same conceptual sphere which indicates general agreement. 
But this reply, that ar t  is intuition, obtains its force and 
meaning from all that it implicitly denies and from which it 
distinguishes art. Wha t  negations are implicit in i t ?  I shall 
indicate the principal, o r  at least those that are the most 
important for us at this present moment of our culture. 
I t  denies, above all, that art  is a physical f ac t :  for  exam- 
ple, certain determined colours, o r  relations of colours; 
certain definite forms of bodies; certain definite sounds, 
o r  relations of sounds; certain phenomena of heat or  of elec- 
tricity-in short, whatsoever be designated as “physical.” 
T h e  inclination toward this error of physicising ar t  is al- 
ready present in ordinary thought, and as children who 
touch the soap-bubble and would wish to touch the rainbow, 
so the human spirit, admiring beautiful things, hastens spon- 
taneously to trace out the reasons for them in external na- 
ture, and proves that it must think, or believes that it 
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should think, certain colours beautiful and certain other col- 
ours ugly, certain forms beautiful and certain other forms 
ugly. But this attempt has been carried out intentionally 
and with method on several occasions in the history of 
thought: from the “canons” which the Greek theoreticians 
and artists fixed for the beauty of bodies, through the specu- 
lations as to  the geometrical and numerical relations of 
figures and sounds, down to the researches of the resthe- 
ticians of the nineteenth century (Fechner, for  example), 
and to  the “communications” presented in our day by the 
inexpert, a t  philosophical, psychological, and natural science 
congresses, concerning the relations of physical phenomena 
with art. And if it be asked why ar t  cannot be a physical 
fact, we must reply, in the first place, that physical facts do 
not  p o s ~ e s s  reality, and that art,  to  which so many devote 
their whole lives and which fills all with a divine joy, is 
supremely real; thus it cannot be a physical fact, which is 
something unreal. This  sounds at  first paradoxical, for 
nothing seems more solid and secure to the ordinary man 
than the physical world; but we, in the seat of truth, must 
not abstain from the good reason and substitute for it one 
less good, solely because the first should have the appear- 
ance of a lie; and besides, in order to  surpass what of 
strange and difficult may be contained in that truth, to  be- 
come at  home with it, we may take into consideration the 
fact that the demonstration of the unreality of the physical 
world has not only been proved in an indisputable manner 
and is admitted by all philosophers (who are not crass mate- 
rialists and are not involved in the strident contradictions of 
materialism), but is professed by these same physicists in the 
spontaneous philosophy which they mingle with their phys- 
ics, when they conceive physical phenomena as products of 
principles that are beyond experience, of atoms or  of ether, 
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or  as the manifestation of an Unknowable: besides, the 
matter itself of the materialists is a supermaterial principle. 
Thus physical facts reveal themselves, by their internal logic 
and by common consent, not as reality, but as a construction 
of our intellect f o r  the purposes of science. Consequently, 
the question whether ar t  be a physical fact must rationally 
assume this different signification : that is to  say, whether 
it be possible t o  construct art  physically. And this is cer- 
tainly possible, for  we indeed carry it out always, when, 
turning from the sense of a poem and ceasing to  enjoy it, 
we set ourselves, for example, to  count the words of which 
the poem is composed and to  divide them into syllables and 
letters; or, disregarding the asthetic effect of a statue, we 
weigh and measure i t :  a most useful performance for the 
packers of statues, as is the other for  the typographers who 
have to  “compose” pages of poetry: but most useless for 
the contemplator and student of art,  to whom it is neither 
useful nor licit to  allow himself to  be “distracted” from his 
proper object. Thus ar t  is not a physical fact in this second 
sense, either ; which amounts to saying that when we propose 
to ourselves to penetrate its nature and mode of action, to  
construct it physically is of no avail. 
Another negation is implied in the definition of art  as in- 
tuition : i f  it be intuition, and intuition is equivalent to theory 
in the original sense of contemplation, a r t  cannot be a utili- 
tarian act; and since a utilitarian act aims always at obtain- 
ing a pleasure and therefore a t  keeping off a pain, art,  
considered in its own nature, has nothing to  do with the 
useful and with pleasure and pain, as such. I t  will be ad- 
mitted, indeed, without much difficulty, that a pleasure as a 
pleasure, any sort of pleasure, is not of itself artistic; the 
pleasure of a drink of water that slakes thirst, or a walk in 
the open air that stretches our limbs and makes our blood 
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circulate more lightly, o r  the obtaining of a longed-for post 
that settles us in practical life, and so on, is not artistic. 
Finally, the difference between pleasure and art  leaps to the 
eyes in the relations that are developed between ourselves 
and works of art, because the figure represented may be dear 
to us and represent the most delightful memories, and at the 
same time the picture may be ugly; or, on the other hand, 
the picture may be beautiful and the figure represented hate- 
ful to our hearts, o r  the picture itself, which we approve as 
beautiful, may also cause us rage and envy, because it is the 
work of our enemy o r  rival, for whom it will procure advan- 
tage and on whom it will confer new strength: our practical 
interests, with their relative pleasures and pains, mingle and 
sometimes become confused with art  and disturb, but are 
never identified with, our asthetic interest. At  the most it 
will be affirmed, with a view to maintaining more effectively 
the definition of art  as the pleasurable, that it is not the 
pleasurable in general, but a particzilar form of the pleasur- 
able. But such a restriction is no longer a defence, it is in- 
deed an abandonment of that thesis; for given that ar t  is a 
particular form of pleasure, its distinctive character would 
be supplied, not by the pleasurable, but by what distinguishes 
that pleasurable from other pleasurables, and it would be 
desirable to turn the attention to that distinctive element- 
more than pleasurable or  different from pleasurable, Nev- 
ertheless, the doctrine that defines art  as the pleasurable has 
a special denomination (hedonistic asthetic), and a long 
and complicated development in the history of asthetic doc- 
trines : it shewed itself in the Graco-Roman world, prevailed 
in the eighteenth century, reflowered in the second half of  
the nineteenth, and still enjoys much favour, being especially 
well received by beginners in Esthetic, who are above all 
struck by the fact that art  causes pleasure. T h e  life of this 
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doctrine has consisted of proposing in turn one o r  another 
class of pleasures, o r  several classes together (the pleasure 
of  the superior senses, the pleasure of play, of consciousness 
of our own strength, of criticism, etc., etc.), or  of adding to  
it elements differing from the pleasurable, the useful for  
example (when understood as distinct from the pleasura- 
ble), the satisfaction of cognoscitive and moral wants, and 
the like. And its progress has been caused just by this rest- 
lessness, and by its allowing foreign elements to ferment in 
its bosom, which it introduces through the necessity of some- 
how bringing itself into agreement with the reality of art, 
thus attaining to its dissolution as hedonistic doctrine and to 
the promotion of a new doctrine, o r  at  least to drawing at- 
tention to its necessity. And since every error has its ele- 
ment of truth (and that of the physical doctrine has been 
seen to be the possibility of the physical “construction” of 
ar t  as of any other fact) ,  the hedonistic doctrine has its eter- 
nal element of truth in the placing in relief the hedonistic 
accompaniment, or  pleasure, common to the Esthetic activity 
as to every form of spiritual activity, which it has not at  all 
been intended to deny in absolutely denying the identification 
of ar t  with the pleasurable, and in distinguishing it from the 
pleasurable by defining it as intuition. 
A third negation, effected by means of the theory of ar t  as 
intuition, is that art  is a moral act; that is to say, that form 
of practical act which, although necessarily uniting with the 
useful and with pleasure and pain, is not immediately utilita- 
rian and hedonistic, and moves in a superior spiritual sphere. 
But the intuition, in so far  as it is a theoretic act, is opposed 
to the practical of any sort. And in truth, art, as has been 
remarked from the earliest times, does not arise as an act of 
the will; good will, which constitutes the honest man, does 
not constitute the artist. And since it is not the result of an 
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act of will, so it escapes all moral discrimination, not because 
a privilege of exemption is accorded to it, but simply because 
moral discrimination cannot be applied to art. An artistic 
image portrays an act morally praiseworthy or  blamewor- 
thy; but this image, as image, is neither morally praisewor- 
thy nor blameworthy. No t  only is there no penal code that 
can condemn an image to prison o r  to death, but no moral 
judgment, uttered by a rational person, can make of i t  its 
object: we might just as well judge the square moral o r  the 
triangle immoral as the Francesca of Dante immoral o r  the 
Cordelia of Shakespeare moral, for these have a purely ar- 
tistic function, they are like musical notes in the souls of 
Dante and of Shakespeare. Further, the moralistic theory 
of ar t  is also represented in the history of esthetic doctrines, 
though much discredited in the common opinion of our times, 
not only on account of its intrinsic demerit, but also, in some 
measure, owing to the moral demerit of certain tendencies 
of our times, which render possible, owing to psychological 
dislike, that refutation of it which should be made-and 
which we here make-solely for logical reasons. The  end 
attributed to art, of directing the good and inspiring horror 
of evil, of correcting and ameliorating customs, is a deriva- 
tion of the moralistic doctrine; and so is the demand ad- 
dressed to artists to collaborate in the education of the lower 
classes, in the strengthening of the national or  bellicose spirit 
of a people, in the diffusion of the ideals of a modest and la- 
borious life; and so on. These are all things that ar t  can- 
not do, any more than geometry, which, however, does not 
lose anything of its importance on account of its inability to 
do this; and one does not see why art  should do so, either. 
Tha t  it cannot do these things was partially perceived by the 
moralistic estheticians also; who very readily effected a 
transaction with it, permitting it to provide pleasures that 
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were not moral, provided they were not openly dishonest. o r  
recommending it to employ to  a good end the dominion that, 
owing to  its hedonistic power, it possessed over souls, to 
gild the pill, to  sprinkle sweetness upon the rim of the glass 
containing the bitter draught-in short, to play the courte- 
zan (since it could not get rid of its old and inborn habits), 
in the service of holy church o r  of morality: meretrix ecck-  
sire. On other occasions they have sought to  avail them- 
selves of it for  purposes of instruction, since not only virtue 
but also science is a difficult thing, and ar t  could remove this 
difficulty and render pleasant and attractive the entrance 
into the ocean of science-indeed, lead them through it as 
through a garden of Armida, gaily and voluptuously, with- 
out their being conscious of the lofty protection they had 
obtained, o r  of the crisis of renovation which they were pre- 
paring for themselves. W e  cannot now refrain from a 
smile when we talk of these theories, but should not forget 
that they were once a serious matter corresponding to a seri- 
ous effort to  understand the nature of art  and to  elevate the 
conception of i t ;  and that among those who believed in it 
( to  limit ourselves to Italian literature) were Dante and 
Tasso, P a r h i  and Alfieri, Manzoni and Mazzini. And 
the moralistic doctrine of ar t  was and is and will be per- 
petually beneficial by its very contradictions; it was and will 
be an effort, however unhappy, to  separate art  from the 
merely pleasing, with which it is sometimes confused, and 
to  assign to it a more worthy post: and it, too, has its true 
side, because, i f  art  be beyond morality, the artist is neither 
this side of it nor that, but under its empire, in so f a r  as he 
is a man who cannot withdraw himself from the duties of 
man, and must look upon ar t  itself-art, which is not and 
never will be moral-as a mission to  be exercised as a priestly 
office. 
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Again (and this is the last and perhaps the most important 
of all the general negations that it suits me to  recall in rela- 
tion to this matter) ,  with the definition of ar t  as intuition, 
we deny that it has the character of conceptual knowledge. 
Conceptual knowledge, in its true form, which is the philo- 
sophical, is always realistic, aiming at  establishing reality 
against unreality, o r  at  lowering unreality by including it in 
reality as a subordinate moment of reality itself. But in- 
tuition means, precisely, indistinction of reality and unreal- 
ity, the image with its value as mere image, the pure ideality 
of the image; and opposing the intuitive or  sensible know- 
ledge to the conceptual o r  intelligible, the zesthetic to the 
noetic, it aims a t  claiming the autonomy of this more simple 
and elementary form of knowledge, which has been com- 
pared to the dream (the dream, and not the sleep) of the 
theoretic life, in respect to which philosophy would be the 
waking. And indeed, whoever should ask, when examining 
a work of art, whether what the artist has expressed be 
metaphysically and historically true or false, asks a question 
that is without meaning, and commits an error analogous to 
his who should bring the airy images of the fancy before 
the tribunal of morality : without meaning, because the 
discrimination of true and false always concerns an affirma- 
tion of reality, o r  a judgment, but it cannot fall under the 
head of an image o r  of a pure subject, which is not the sub- 
ject of a judgment, since it is without qualification o r  predi- 
cate. I t  is useless to object that the individuality of the 
image cannot subsist without reference to the universal, of 
which that image is the individuation, because we do not 
here deny that the universal, as the spirit of God, is every- 
where and animates all things with itself, but we deny that 
the universal is rendered logically explicit and is thought 
in the intuition. Useless also is the appeal to the principle 
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of the unity of the spirit, which is not broken, but, on the 
contrary, strengthened by the clear distinction of fancy from 
thought, because from the distinction comes opposition, and 
from opposition concrete unity. 
Ideality (as  has also been called this character that dis- 
tinguishes the intuition from the concept, art  from philoso- 
phy and from history, from the affirmation of the universal 
and from the perception or narration of what has hap- 
pened) is the intimate virtue of a r t :  no sooner are reflection 
and judgment developed from that ideality, than art  is dis- 
sipated and dies: it dies in the artist, who becomes a critic; 
it dies in the contemplator, who changes from an entranced 
enjoyer of art  to a meditative observer of life. 
But the distinction of art  from philosophy (taken widely 
as including all thinking of the real) brings with it other 
distinctions, among which that of ar t  from myth occupies 
the foremost place. For  myth, to him who believes in it, 
presents itself as the revelation and knowledge of reality 
as opposed to  unreality,-a reality that drives away other 
beliefs as illusory o r  false. I t  can become art  only for him 
who no longer believes in it and avails himself of mythology 
as a metaphor, of the austere world of the gods as of a 
beautiful world, of God as of an image of sublimity. Con- 
sidered, then, in its genuine reality, in the soul of the believer 
and not of the unbeliever, it is religion and not simple fancy; 
and religion is philosophy, philosophy in process of becom- 
ing, philosophy more or  less imperfect, but philosophy, as 
philosophy is religion, more o r  less purified and elaborated, 
in continuous process of elaboration and purification, but 
religion or thought of the Absolute or Eternal. Ar t  lacks 
the thought that is necessary ere it can become myth and 
religion, and the faith that is born of thought; the artist 
neither believes nor disbelieves in his image : he produces 
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it. And, for a different reason, the concept of art  as in- 
tuition excludes, on the other hand, the conception of art  as 
the production of classes and types, species and genera, o r  
again (as  a great mathematician and philosopher had occa- 
sion to  say of music), as an exercise of unconscious arith- 
metic; that is, it distinguishes art  from the positive sciences 
and from mathematics, in both of which appears the con- 
ceptual form, though without realistic character, as mere 
general representation o r  mere abstraction. But that ideal- 
ity which natural and mathematical science would seem to  
assume, as opposed to the world of philosophy, of religion 
and of history, and which would seem to approximate it to 
ar t  (and owing to  which scientists and mathematicians of 
our day are so ready to  boast of creating worlds, of fictiones, 
resembling the fictions and figurations of the poets, even in 
their vocabulary), is gained with the renunciation of con- 
crete thought, by means of generalisation and abstraction, 
which are capricious, volitional decisions, practical acts, and, 
as practical acts, extraneous and inimical to the world of 
art. Thus it happens that art  manifests much more repug- 
nance toward the positive and mathematical sciences than 
toward philosophy, religion and history, because these seem 
to it to be fellow-citizens of the same world of theory or  of 
knowledge, whereas those others shock it with the brutality 
toward contemplation of the practical world. Poetry and 
classification, and, worse still, poetry and mathematics, ap- 
pear to be as little in agreement as fire and water: the esprit 
mathe'matique and the esprit scientifique, the most declared 
enemies of the esprit poe'tique; those periods in which the 
natural sciences and mathematics prevail ( for  example, the 
intellectualism of the eighteenth century) seem to be the 
least fruitful in poetry. 
And since this vindication of the alugical character of art  
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is, as I have said, the most difficult and important of the 
negations included in the formula of art-intuition, the 
theories that attempt to explain art  as philosophy, as re- 
ligion, as history, or as science, and in a lesser degree as 
mathematics, occupy the greater part of the history of 
Esthetic science and are adorned with the names of the 
greatest philosophers. Schelling and Hegel afford examples 
of the identification or  confusion of art  with religion and 
philosophy in the eighteenth century; Taine, of its confusion 
with the natural sciences ; the theories of the French verists, 
of  its confusion with historical and documentary observa- 
tion; the formalism of the Herbartians, of its confusion with 
mathematics. But it would be vain to seek pure examples of 
these errors in any of these authors and in the others that 
might be mentioned, because error is never pure, for  i f  it 
were so, it would be truth. Thus  the doctrines of art  that 
for the sake of brevity I shall term “conceptualistic” contain 
elements of dissolution, the more copious and efficacious 
by as much as the spirit of the philosopher who professed 
them was energetic, and therefore nowhere are they so 
copious and efficacious as in Schelling and Hegel, who thus 
had so lively a consciousness of artistic production as to  sug- 
gest by their observations and their particular developments 
a theory opposed to that maintained in their systems. Fur- 
thermore, the very conceptualistic theories are superior to 
the others previously examined, not only in so fa r  as they 
recognise the theoretic character of art,  but also carry with 
them their contribution to the true doctrine, owing to the 
claim that they make for  a determination of the relations 
(which, i f  they be of distinction, are also of unity) between 
fancy and logic, between art  and thought. 
And here we can already see how the simplest formula, 
that ‘(art is intuition,”-which, translated into other sym- 
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bolical terms ( for  example, that “art is the work of fancy”), 
is to  be found in the mouths of all those who daily discuss 
art, and is to  be found in older terms (“imitation,” “fiction,” 
“fable,” etc.) in so many old books,-pronounced now in the 
text of a philosophical discourse, becomes filled with a his- 
torical, critical, and polemical content, of which I can hardly 
here give any example. And it will no longer cause astonish- 
ment that its philosophical conquest should have cost an 
especially great amount of toil, because that conquest is like 
setting foot upon a little hill long fought for in battle. I ts  
easy ascent by the thoughtless pedestrian in time of peace 
is a very different matter; it is not a simple resting-place 
on a walk, but the symbol and result of the victory of an 
army. T h e  historian of resthetic follows the steps of its diffi- 
cult progress, in which (and this is another magical act of 
thought) the conqueror, instead of losing strength through 
the blows that his adversary inflicts upon him, acquires new 
strength through these very blows, and reaches the sighed-for 
eminence, repulsing his adversary, and yet in his company. 
Here  I cannot do more than record in passing the importance 
of the Aristotelian concept of mimesis (arising in opposition 
to the Platonic condemnation of poetry), and the attempt 
made by the same philosopher to  distinguish poetry and his- 
tory:  a concept that was not sufficiently developed, and per- 
haps not altogether mature in his mind, and therefore long 
misunderstood, but which was yet to serve, after many cen- 
turies, as the point of departure for modern resthetic 
thought. And I will mention in passing the ever-increasing 
consciousness of the difference between logic and fancy,  be- 
tween judgment and taste, between intellect and genius, 
which became ever more lively during the course of the sev- 
enteenth century, and the solemn form which the contest 
between Poetry  and Metaphysic assumed in the “Scienza 
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Nuova” of Vico; and also the scholastic construction of an 
Bsthet ica ,  distinct from a Logicu, as Gnoseologia inferior 
and Scientia cognitionis sensitivd, in Baumgarten, who, how- 
ever, remained involved in the conceptualistic conception of 
art, and did not carry out his project; and the Critique of 
Kant directed against Baumgarten and all the Leibnitzians 
and Wolffians, which made it clear that intuition is intuition 
and not a “confused concept” ; and romanticism, which 
perhaps better developed the new idea of art, announced 
by Vico, in its artistic criticism and in its histories than in 
its systems; and, finally, the criticism inaugurated in Italy by 
Francesco de Sanctis, who caused art  as pure form, or  pure 
intuition, to prevail over all utilitarianism, moralism, and 
conceptualism ( to  adopt his vocabulary), 
But doubt springs up at  the feet of truth, “like a young 
shoot,”-as the terzinu of father Dante has it,-doubt, 
which is what drives the intellect of man “from mount to 
mount.’’ T h e  doctrine of art  as intuition, as fancy, as form, 
now gives rise to an ulterior ( I  have not said an “ultimate”) 
problem, which is no longer one of opposition and distinc- 
tion toward physics, hedonistic, ethic and logic, but the field 
of images itself, which sets in doubt the capacity of the im- 
age to define the character of ar t  and is in reality occupied 
with the mode of separating the genuine from the spurious 
image, and of enriching in this way the concept of the image 
and of art. Wha t  function (it is asked) can a world of 
pure images possess in the spirit of man, without philosophi- 
cal, historical, religious o r  scientific value, and without even 
moral o r  hedonistic value? Wha t  is more vain than to 
dream with open eyes in life, which demands, not only open 
eyes, but an open mind and a nimble spirit? Pure images ! 
But to nourish oneself upon pure images is called by a name 
of little honour, “to dream,” and there is usually added to 
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this the epithet of “idle.” I t  is a very insipid and inconclu- 
sive thing; can it ever be a r t?  Certainly, we sometimes 
amuse ourselves with the reading of some sensational ro- 
mance of adventure, where images follow images in the most 
various and unexpected way; but we thus enjoy ourselves in 
moments of fatigue, when we are obliged to kill time, and 
with a full consciousness that such stuff is not art.  Such in- 
stances are of the nature of a pastime, a game; but were art 
a game or  a pastime, it would fall into the wide arms of 
hedonistic doctrine, ever open to receive it. And it is a 
utilitarian and hedonistic need that impels us sometimes to 
relax the bow of the mind and the bow of the will, and to 
stretch ourselves, allowing images to follow one another in 
our memory, or combining them in quaint forms with the aid 
of the imagination, in a sort of waking sleep, from which we 
rouse ourselves as soon as we are rested; and we sometimes 
rouse ourselves just to  devote ourselves to  the work of art ,  
which cannot be produced by a mind relaxed. Thus either 
ar t  is not pure intuition, and the claims put forward in the 
doctrines which we believed we had above confuted, are not 
satisfied, and so the confutation itself of these doctrines is 
troubled with doubts ; o r  intuition cannot consist in a simple 
act of imagination. 
In order to render the problem more exact and more diffi- 
cult, it will be well to eliminate from it at once that part  to  
which the answer is easy, and which I have not wished to  
neglect, precisely because it is usually united and confused 
with it. T h e  intuition is the product of an image, and not of 
an incoherent mass of images obtained by recalling former 
images and allowing them to succeed one another capri- 
ciously, by combining one image with another in a like capri- 
cious manner, joining a horse’s neck to a human head, and 
thus playing a childish game. Old Poetic availed itself 
“What is Art?” 243 
above all of  the concept of unity, in order to express this 
distinction between the intuition and imagining, insisting 
that whatever the artistic work, it should be simplex et 
unum; or of the allied concept of unity in variety-that is to  
say, the multiple images were to find their common centre 
unit of union in a comprehensive image: and the Esthetic of 
the nineteenth century created with the same object the dis- 
tinction, which appears in not a few of its philosophers, 
between fancy (the peculiar artistic faculty) and imagina- 
tion (the extra-artistic faculty). T o  amass, select, cut up, 
combine images, presupposes the possession of particular 
images in the spirit; and fancy produces, whereas im- 
agination is sterile, adapted to  extrinsic combinations and 
not to the generation of organism and life. T h e  most pro- 
found problem, contained beneath the rather superficial 
formula with which I first presented it, is, then: Wha t  
is the office of the pure image in the life of the spirit? or  
(which at bottom amounts to  the same thing), H o w  does 
the pure image come into existence? Every inspired work 
of art  gives rise to a long series of imitators, who just re- 
peat, cut up in pieces, combine, and mechanically exaggerate 
that work, and by so doing play the part  of imagination 
toward or  against the fancy. But what is the justification, 
or what the genesis, of the work of genius, which is after- 
ward submitted ( a  sign of glory!) to such torments? In 
order to make this point clear, we must go deeply into the 
character of fancy or  pure intuition. 
And the best way to  prepare this deeper study is to recall 
to mind and to  criticise the theories with which it has been 
sought to  differentiate artistic intuition from merely in- 
coherent imagination (while taking care not to  fall into real- 
ism or conceptualism), to  establish in what the principle of 
unity consists, and to  justify the productive character of the 
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fancy. T h e  artistic image (it has been said) is such, when 
it unites the intelligible with the sensible, and represents an 
idea. Now “intelligible” and “idea” cannot mean anything 
but concept (nor  has it a different meaning with those who 
maintain this doctrine) ; even though it be the concrete con- 
cept o r  idea, proper to lofty philosophical speculation, which 
differs from the abstract concept o r  from the representa- 
tive concept of the sciences. But in any case, the concept o r  
idea always unites the intelligible to the sensible, and not 
only in art, for the new concept of the concept, first stated by 
Kant and (so to speak) immanent in all modern thought, 
heals the breach between the sensible and the intelligible 
worlds, conceives the concept as judgment, and the judgment 
as synthesis a priori, and the synthesis a priori as the word 
become flesh, as history. Thus that definition of art  leads 
the fancy back to logic and art  to philosophy, contrary to 
intention; and is at  most valid for the abstract conception of 
science, not for  the problem of ar t  (the resthetic and teleo- 
logical “Critique of Judgment” of Kant had precisely 
this historical function of correcting what of abstract there 
yet remained in the “Critique of Pure Reason”). To seek a 
sensible element for  the concept, beyond that which it has 
already absorbed in itself as concrete concept, and beyond 
the words in which it expresses itself, would be superfluous. 
If we persist in this search, it is true that we abandon the 
conception of art  as philosophy o r  history, but only to pass 
to the conception of ar t  as a2legory. And the unsurmounta- 
ble difficulties of the allegory are well known, as its frigid 
and anti-historical character is known and universally felt. 
Allegory is the extrinsic union, the conventional and arbi- 
trary juxtaposition of two spiritual acts, a concept or  thought 
and an image, where it is assumed that this image must 
represent that concept. And not only is the individual char. 
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acter of the artistic image not explained by this, but, in addi- 
tion, a duality is purposely created, because thought remains 
thought and image image in this juxtaposition, without rela- 
tion between themselves; so much so, that in contemplating 
the image, we forget the concept without any disadvantage, 
-indeed, with advantage,-and in thinking the concept, 
we dissipate, also with advantage, the superfluous and tire- 
some image. Allegory enjoyed much favour in the Middle 
Ages, that mixture of Germanism and Romanism, of bar- 
barism and culture, of bold fancy and of acute reflection; 
but it was the theoretic element in, and not the effective real- 
ity of, the same mediaval art  which, where it is art, drives 
allegory away from or  resolves it in itself. This need for 
the solution of allegorical dualism leads to the refining of 
the theory of intuition, in so fa r  as it is allegory of the idea, 
into the other theory, of the intuition as-symbol; for the 
idea does not stand by itself in the symbol, thinkable sepa- 
rately from the symbolising representation, nor does the 
symbol stand by itself, representable in a lively manner 
without the idea symbolised. T h e  idea is all reduced to rep- 
resentation (as said the asthetician Vischer, i f  to anyone be- 
longs the blame of the very prosaic comparison for so poetic 
and metaphysical a theme), like a lump of sugar melted 
in a glass of water, which exists and acts in every molecale 
of water, but is no longer to be found as a lump of sugar. 
But the idea that has disappeared, the idea that has become 
entirely representative, the idea that we can no longer suc- 
ceed in seizing as idea (save by extracting it, like sugar from 
sugared water),  is no longer idea, and is only the sign that 
the unity of the artistic image has not yet been achieved. 
Certainly art is symbol, all symbol-that is, all significant; 
but symbol of what? Wha t  does it mean? The  intuition is 
truly artistic, it is truly intuition, and not a chaotic mass of  
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images, only when it has a vital principle that animates it, 
making it all one with itself; but what is this principle? 
T h e  answer to such a question may be said to  result from 
the examination of the greatest ideal strife that has ever 
taken place in the field of art (and is not confined to the epoch 
that took its name from it and in which it was predomi- 
nant) : the strife between romanticism and classicism. Giv- 
ing the general definition, here convenient, and setting aside 
minor and accidental determinations, romanticism asks of 
art, above all, the spontaneous and violent effusion of the af- 
fections, of love and hate, of anguish and jubilation, of des- 
peration and elevation; and is willingly satisfied and pleased 
with vaporous and indeterminate images, broken and allu- 
sive in style, with vague suggestions, with approximate 
phrases, with powerful and troubled sketches : while classi- 
cism loves the peaceful soul, the wise design, figures studied 
in their characteristics and precise in outline, ponderation, 
equilibrium, clarity; and resolutely tends toward represen- 
tation, as the other tends toward feeling. And whoever puts 
himself a t  one or the other point of view finds crowds of 
reasons for maintaining it and for confuting the opposite 
point of view; because (say the romantics), Wha t  is the 
use of an art, rich in beautiful images, which, nevertheless, 
does not speak to the heart? And i f  it do speak to the 
heart, what is the use i f  the images be not beautiful? And 
the others will say, Wha t  is the use of the shock of the pas- 
sions, i f  the spirit do not rest upon a beautiful image? 
And if the image be beautiful, if our taste be satisfied, 
what matters the absence of those emotions which can all 
of them be obtained outside art, and which life does not 
fail to provide, sometimes in greater quantity than we de- 
sire?-But when we begin to feel weary of the fruitless 
defence of both partial views; above all, when we turn 
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away from the ordinary works of  art produced by the ro- 
mantic and classical schools, from works convulsed with 
passion or coldly decorous, and fix them on the works, 
not of the disciples, but of the masters, not of the medio- 
cre, but of the supreme, we see the contest disappear in 
the distance and find ourselves unable to  call the great por- 
tions of these works, romantic or  classic or  representative, 
because they are both classic and romantic, feelings and 
representations, a vigorous feeling which has become all 
most brilliant representation. Such, for  example, are the 
works of Hellenic art, and such those of Italian poetry 
and ar t :  the transcendentalism of the Middle Ages be- 
came fixed in the bronze of the Dantesque terzina; melan- 
choly and suave fancy, in the transparency of the songs and 
sonnets of Petrarch; sage experience of life and badinage 
with the fables of the past, in the limpid ottava rima of 
Ariosto; heroism and the thought of death, in the perfect 
blank-verse hendecasyllabics of Foscolo ; the infinite variety 
of everything, in the sober and austere songs of Giacomo 
Leopardi. Finally (be it said in parenthesis and without 
intending comparison with the other examples adduced), the 
voluptuous refinel;nents and animal sensuality of interna- 
tional decadentism have received their most perfect expres- 
sion in the prose and verse of an Italian, D’Annunzio. All 
these souls were profoundly passionate (all, even the serene 
Lodovico Ariosto, who was so amorous, so tender, and so 
often represses his emotion with a smile) ; their works of 
ar t  are the eternal flower that springs from their passions. 
These expressions and these critical judgments can be 
theoretically resumed in the formula, that what gives co- 
herence and unity to the intuition is feeling: the intuition is 
really such because it represents a feeling, and can only ap- 
pear from and upon that. Not the idea, but the feeling, is 
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what confers upon ar t  the airy lightness of the symbol: an 
aspiration enclosed in the circle of a representation-that is 
a r t ;  and in it the aspiration alone stands for the representa- 
tion, and the representation alone for the aspiration. Epic 
and lyric, o r  drama and lyric, are scholastic divisions of the 
indivisible: ar t  is always lyrical-that is, epic and dramatic 
in feeling. Wha t  we admire in genuine works of ar t  is the 
perfect fanciful form which a state of the soul assumes; and 
we call this life, unity, solidity of the work of art. Wha t  
displeases us in the false and imperfect forms is the struggle 
of several different states of the soul not yet unified, their 
stratification, or mixture, their vacillating method, which 
obtains apparent unity from the will of the author, who for 
this purpose avails himself of an abstract plan or  idea, o r  of 
extra-asthetic, passionate emotion. A series of images 
which seem to be, each in turn, rich in power of conviction, 
leaves us nevertheless deluded and diffident, because we do 
not see them generated from a state of the soul, from a 
“sketch” (as the painters call i t ) ,  from a motive; and 
they follow one another and crowd together without that 
precise intonation, without that accent, which comes from 
the heart. And what is the figure cut out from the back- 
ground of the picture or  transported and placed against 
another background, what is the personage of drama or  of 
romance outside his relation with all the other personages 
and with the general action? And what is the value of this 
general action if it be not an action of the spirit of the au- 
thor? T h e  secular disputes concerning dramatic unity are 
interesting in this connection ; they are first applied to the 
unity of “action” when they have been obtained from an 
extrinsic determination of time and place, and this finally 
applied to the unity of “interest,” and the interest would 
have to  be in its turn dissolved in the interest of the spirit of 
“What is Art?” 249 
the poet-that is, in his intimate aspiration, in his feeling. 
T h e  negative issue of the great dispute between classicists 
and romanticists is interesting, for it resulted in the negation 
both of the ar t  which strives to  distract and illude the soul 
as to  the deficiency of the image with mere feeling, with 
the practical violence of feeling, with feeling that has not 
become contemplation, and of the art  which, by means of the 
superficial clearness of the image, of drawing correctly false, 
of the word falsely correct, seeks to  deceive as to its lack of 
inspiration and its lack of an aesthetic reason to  justify what 
it has produced. A celebrated sentence uttered by an Eng- 
lish critic, and become one of the commonplaces of journal- 
ism, states that “all the arts tend to  the condition of music”; 
but it would have been more accurate to  say that all the arts 
are music, i f  it be thus intended to  emphasise the genesis of 
aesthetic images in feeling, excluding from their number those 
mechanically constructed o r  realistically ponderous. And 
another not less celebrated utterance of a Swiss semi-philos- 
opher, which has had the like good or bad fortune of be- 
coming trivial, discovers that “every landscape is a state of 
the soul” : which is indisputable, not because the Iandscape is 
landscape, but because the landscape is art. 
Artistic intuition, then, is always lyrical intuition : this 
latter being a word that is not present as an adjective or  
definition of the first, but as a synonym, another of the 
synonyms that can be united to the several that I have men- 
tioned already, and which, all of them, designate the intuition. 
And if it be sometimes convenient that instead of appearing 
as a synonym, it should assume the grammatical form of 
the adjective, that is only to  make clear the difference be- 
tween the intuition-image, or nexus of images ( for  what 
is called image is always a nexus of images, since image- 
atoms do not exist any more than thought-atoms), which 
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constitutes the organism, and, as organism, has its vital prin- 
ciple, which is the organism itself,-between this, which is 
true and proper intuition, and that false intuition which is a 
heap of images put together in play or intentionally or  for 
some other practical purpose, the connection of which, be- 
ing practical, shows itself to  be not organic, but mechanic, 
when considered from the mthetic point of view. But the 
word lyric would be redundant save in this explicative or  
polemical sense; and art  is perfectly defined when it is simply 
defined as intuition. 
